讲座通知：Competitor Cooperation in Sourcing2019-09-10
讲座题目：Competitor Cooperation in Sourcing
时 间： 9月12日（周四）上午10:00-12:00
地 点： 188滚球网站313会议室
We consider two competing firms that order from an external supplier and sell in uncertain markets. The supplier offers a common wholesale-price menu. The firms can either form a cooperative to order from the supplier together (joint sourcing), or unilaterally order from the supplier but obtain stocks from each other on a needed basis (horizontal sourcing). We show that the firms rely on collaborative sourcing, in either form, to mitigate quantity pressure when the supplier offers a low or no discount but save costs otherwise. Joint and horizontal sourcing are strategic substitutes, though joint sourcing is more effective in saving cost and improving market selling. These two strategies are complements as well since the firms have the flexibility in deploying stocks across markets to utilize differential selling opportunities only by horizontal sourcing. Once the firms jointly source, strategic substitutability has them forfeit horizontal sourcing in deterministic markets, but strategic complementarity has them adopt it in volatile markets. Once the firms source from each other, further forming a cooperative to engage in joint sourcing has mixed profit implications. Importantly, sourcing cooperation between firms does not necessarily hurt the supplier, and their increased orders that may result from this strategic move does not necessarily benefit the supplier either. The supplier can tailor the wholesale-price menu to fit the firms’ sourcing strategy and generate a profit gain to every party.
李力，中山大学岭南（大学）学院商务管理系副教授。于香港科技大学，香港理工大学，浙江大学分别获得运营管理博士，运营管理硕士，自动化学士学位。目前主要从事运营管理与营销学，经济学，会计学等交叉学科方向研究，并主持国家自然科学基金项目。迄今为止，以第一作者或独立作者在多个国际顶级（UTD 24）以及一流学术期刊，如 Production and Operations Management，European Journal of Operational Research，Transportation Research Part E，Journal of the Operational Research Society发表多篇学术成果。